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From the Alliance of Economies
to the Alliance of Civilizations:

Turkey's Strategic Role and Importance
Murat Doral

In "The Clash of Civilizations;' Huntington hypothesized that
the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between
groups of different civilizations, and concluded that the "clash
of civilizations" will dominate global politics in the future.
In addition, Huntington declared Turkey as one of the "torn
countries" and tried to make connections between its Muslim
identity and its delayed ED membership. The growing trade and
investments volume tell us that regardless of our differences,
people around the world understand the benefits of economic
cooperation and would prefer this route to starting a war of
civilizations.
Introduction

In "The Clash of Civilizations;' Samuel Huntington (Summer 1993) predicted
that the fundamental source of conflict in the world would be primarily cultural,
not ideological or economic. He hypothesized that even though nation states will
remain powerful actors in world affairs, the future geo-political conflicts will occur
between "groups of different civilizations" (Summer 1993, p.22). Furthermore, he
maintained that the civilizational fault lines will be "the battle lines of the future"
(Summer 1993, p.22). Huntington was not the first social scientist to use this
controversial term in an analytical context. In fact, "The Clash of Civilizations"
was first coined a few years before Huntington in an article written by Princeton
historian Bernard Lewis (1990).
According to Huntington, between the French Revolution and the end of
World War I, the conflicts have been mainly among nation-states. This situation
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changed between the two World Wars when conflicts became ideological. After
World War II the main conflict has been between two ideological superpowers:
the United States and the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era, however,
Huntington predicted that "international politics would move out of its Western
phase" (Summer 1993, p.23) and its focal point would be the «interaction between
the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations"
(Summer 1993, p.23). He especially focused on the possible future confrontation
between the West and Islam. Interestingly enough, he also declared that the nonWestern civilizations would no longer be colonial targets, but they would be the
shapers of world history along with the West.

The Historical Evidence
After defining a civilization as the "highest cultural grouping of people and the
broadest level of cultural identity;) Huntington (Summer 1993, p.24 ) accepted the
fact that civilizations may blend, expand, contract, and may even merge or break
into sub-civilizations. Nevertheless, he stuck with his initial prediction about
a future clash among civilizations, and specifically focused on a clash between
Islam and the West. His prediction has been primarily based on the assumption
that countries that make up the Western and Islamic worlds are uniform and
monolithic entities that are separated by well defined cultural and civilizational
fault lines. However) that is far from the truth. Both Islam and the West are quite
diverse and there are many variations in them in terms of social) economic)
cultural, and religious norms and practices.
So far) a Huntingtonian type of epic clash between the West and Islam hasn't
taken place. Edward Said of Columbia University objected to Huntington)s thesis
and went on to say that "the Clash of Civilizations thesis is a gimmick like the
War of the Worlds) better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical
understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time" (2001, p.13).

Some Facts about Islam
Even though the purpose of this paper is not to analyze Islam and its teachings) it
is important to comprehend what Islam is and where it is coming from. Especially
in the context of a possible conflict between Islam and the West) it is crucial to be
aware of the misconceptions about the Islamic way of life.
First of all) it is important to understand that like Christianity and
Judaism, Islam consists of many sects) races, nationalities, practices, clothing
styles) and even different schools of law in interpreting the Sharia, the Islamic
religious law.
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Second, there is a long tradition of tolerance in Islam toward Christianity
and Judaism. Islam treated Christians and Jews as ahl-al Khitab, or «people
of the Book:' who were granted religious freedom as «protected minorities»
under the Sharia law (Armstrong, 1993, p.159). Under the millet system,
for example, for centuries the Ottomans showed tolerance toward religious
minorities and granted them a degree of autonomy in their internal affairs
(Lewis, 2002, p. 33-34).
Third, another misconception about Islam is that Prophet Muhammad was
a warlord who tried to impose Islam by force. In fact, he was fighting for his and
his followers' lives. When Meccans tried to force the Prophet and his followers
into submission through starvation, they migrated to Medina (Armstrong,
1993, p. 152-153). Ironically, Meccans later accepted Islam and Mecca became
the holiest city in Islam.
Fourth, another fallacy about Islam has been in the area of women's rights.
Let's recall that the first ever Muslim was a woman, Muhammad's wife, Khadijah.
Also, his daughter, Fatimah Al-Zahra from Khadijah, was a prominent and
active figure in the early Islamic community who married Ali, the first Imam of
Shia Islam. Furthermore, the Qur'an strictly defined the legal rights of women
and granted them the right to divorce, inherit, own property, and sign contracts
which did not exist in the West until the 19th and 20 th centuries (Armstrong,
1993, p.157-158).
Finally, in Islam and in the Qur'an, war is abhorrent and would be acceptable
only ifit is for self-defense (Armstrong, 1993, p. 156). According to Bernard Lewis
(2001), there are even well defined guidelines which deal in detail with the rules
of engagement, conclusion, and even the weapons that may be used in war.
From An Economic Perspective

The actual data shows us that regions, nations, and countries benefit a great deal
from economic cooperation and integration. Thus, rather than engaging in an
epic clash they first try to engage in voluntary exchange in products, technology,
capital, and ideas. They may even forge economic alliances in an attempt to
improve the living standards of their citizens. Fortunately, nations, countries)
and governments) rich or poor) do not go into war with each other without
considering the benefits and costs associated with their decisions. It's almost
a certain bet that decision makers around the world are aware of the fact that
organizing, supplying, and conducting a war requires a tremendous amount of
sacrifice in terms of resources, human as well as financial.
The core ofeconomic analysis is about our daily lives and how we deal with the
problem of scarcity. Therefore) we all try to squeeze the maximum possible from
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our scarce resources and have very much the same aspirations in life regardless of
our differences. We all would like to have a home, a family, a good education for
our children, good health, friends, jobs, and financial security. In other words, in
pursuit of self-interest and bettering' ourselves, we behave quite materialistically.
Ironically yet, Huntington stubbornly stuck with the idea that it is not ideology
or economics but religion and bloodline that are CCwhat people identify with and
what they will fight and die for" (November-December 1993, p.194).
Contrary to Huntington's prediction, our recent history teaches us that
clashes can occur anywhere and anytime regardless of the differences in
cultures or religions. For example, World War II started in Europe among
countries which pretty much represented the same Christian civilization. Also,
the war between Shiite Iran and Sunni-dominated Iraq was a war among two
predominantly Muslim countries which lasted about eight years. The invasion
of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army in 1990 was about oil and economics
but definitely not a war of civilizations or cultures. Facing bankruptcy, he tried
to force himself into the lucrative oil riches of the region by bullying a much
smaller Kuwait. In addition, the people of the United States today do not start
civil war with each other although they come from an amazing array of national,
cultural, racial, and religiOUS backgrounds. Conversely, the American Civil War
was mostly a war of economics and was fought between the Christian South
and Christian North.
Even though Huntington has been dismissive towards economics and
economic interest as determining factors of human behavior, growing trade
and increasing volume of direct investment around the orld would prove that
economic interest is an important factor in decision making. Economic analysis
teaches us that humans are rational beings and the reI on the marginal principle
in decision making. Marginal changes are incremental changes and can be thought
as "adjustments around the edges of what you are doing" ( ankiw, 2009, p. 6).
To an economist it is incomprehensible to think that human groups, societies, or
nations would start wars among civilization ba d impl on faith, blood, and
belief. In economics, decisions are made ba ed
-benefit calculations and
distributional judgments (Blaug, 1988, p. 606-60 .
u h the division of labor,
Economics goes further and theorize th
ooperate and improve
specialization, and voluntary exchange cou ri
ha Huntington called a
their living standards. This is quite in con r
cccivilizational paradigm" (November- Dece
r
.1 7) for comprehending,
coping, and dealing with the ongoing shift i
Ii ic .
human societies' desire
The increasing level of international tra
d cooperation to never
to trade off greater wealth and prosperi th
i 'lizational wars. In the
ending divisive arguments over cultural di
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global market-place, being late or behind in the game ofproductivity and efficiency
will impact a country's position and its living standards in the long run.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and His Legacy
What became known as "Kemalisrri' in Turkey and around the world has been
a mixture of a republican form of government representing the power of the
people, secular administration, and non-expansionist form of nationalism with
a focus on economic development, and modernization of Turkey. Ataturk's
policies were generally influenced by his drive to pull Turkey out of its economic
backwardness.
After the War ofIndependence and the declaration ofthe new Turkish Republic,
Ataturk's main goal became to modernize the Turkish society and economy
through a series of reforms and programs which were executed at a rapid pace.
For example, he fought relentlessly for the rights of Turkish women. In a series of
speeches delivered in early 1920s, he told his people that the country's "most urgent
present task is to catch up with the modern world;' and that would be impossible if
only "half the population would modernize" (Lewis, 2002, p. 72).
Ataturk wanted to see a well developed national Turkish economy which could
compete on the world stage with the most modern and advanced economies of
the time. In order to catch up with the West, the new republican administration
gave the first priority to the development of a successful national economy.

Turkey's Strategic Role and Importance
Despite Ataturk's efforts and drive to modernize the Turkish society and
economy, achieving economic growth, and establishing a viable democracy
has been a long battle in the Turkish Republic. The process of transforming
the country from a monarchy to a republic and from a one-party republic to
a multi-party democratic system has been an agonizing process with a lot of
political turmoil. When Time magazine (1958) called prime minister Menderes
((an impatient builder:' the country was still earning most of its foreign exchange
by exporting its traditional cash crops, more than 65% of Turkey's 20 million
citizens were illiterate, about 80% of the country's 36,000 villages had no proper
drinking water, and most of the population had almost no influence on the
country's political decisions.
Nonetheless, today's Turkey is a multi-party democracy with a wide range of
political parties representing a variety of ideas and ideologies. Even though there
are serious political frictions among factions, democratic principles are strongly
entrenched and widely accepted by the general public. The dynamic Turkish
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private sector and its new generation of young entrepreneurs are replacing the
public sector in every segment of the economy. Against all odds and after 10
economic crises in 86 years, Turkey has the world's 16th largest economy with a
purchasing power parity adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) of $906 billion
in 2008. Given that Turkey's estimated population was 74.8 million in 2008, the
GDP per capita was $12,116 which ranks Turkey as an upper middle class country
(see Table 1).
Table 1: World's Largest Economies, 2008 (Million USn)
Region/Country

1

2008 GOP
(Purchasing Power Parity) in million $s

World

$69,490,000

EU

$14,820,000

US

$14,290,000

2

China

$7,800,000

3

Japan

$4,348,000

4

India

$3,267,000

5

Germany

$2,863,000

6

UK

$2,231,000

7

Russia

$2,225,000

8

France

$2,097,000

9

Brazil

$1,990,000

10

Italy

$1,821,000

11

Mexico

$1,559,000

12

Spain

$1,378,000

13

Canada

$1,307,000

14

S. Korea

$1,278,000

15

Indonesia

$915,900,

16

Turkey

$906,500,

Source: Based on figures for 2008 as reported in the CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/ra nkorder/2001 rank.html ?countryName==Turkey&country(ode==tu&region(ode==me&rank== 17#tu

Despite three military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980, many economic and
political crises, past policy mistakes, and current difficulties, today's Turkey stands
as a force of stability and prosperity in its region. It has a dynamic economy and
its political system is a representative democracy. In fact, Turkey has been the
first predominantly Muslim country which chose to become a secular republic,
adopt market economics, and democratic rule.
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In its 86 years of history, the Turkish Republic went through six deep and
four mild economic recessions (Kazgan, 2005, p. 2). In addition, the Turkish
economy suffered in the past from many balance of payments problems, currency devaluations, and depreciations (see Table 2).
Table 2: Depreciation of the Turkish Lira
Years

Depreciation of the Turkish Lira (%)

1946
1958
1970
1978
1979
1979
1980
1994
2001
2002
2006
2008

53.3
68.8
66.6
23.0
5.6
24.2
32.8
38.8
25.3
31.2
29.2
40.0

Source: Based on figures as reported in Hurriyet by M. Rauf Ates, October 27, 2008. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.as
pX?id= 10217965&yazarid=254&tarih=2008-1 0-27

During the global financial crisis of late 1990s, the country went through one
of its worst economic downturns. The Turkish GDP first contracted by 3.4% in
1999, then expanded by6.8% in 2000, and then contracted again by 5.7% in 2001,
one of the worst performances since the Great Depression (See Table 3). Despite
the depth of the recession, and with the help and timely funding by the IMF, the
economy bounced back in a short period of time and grew at an average rate of
6.8% between 2002 and 2007.
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Table 3: GDP Growth/Decline in Constant 1998 Prices (Billion TRL - Turkish Lira)
GOP
TRL Billions
Constant 1998 Prices

GOP
Percentage
Change

1998

TRL 70.20

--

1999

TRL 67.84

-3.36

2000

TRL 72.44

6.77

2001

TRL 68.31

-5.70

2002

TRL 72.52

6.16

2003

TRL 76.34

5.26

2004

TRL 83.49

9.36

2005

TRL 90.50

8.40

2006

TRL 96.74

6.89

2007

TRL 101.21

4.62

2002-2007

Average Growth Rate

6.78

1998-2007

Average Growth Rate

4.52

Source: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Maliye Bakanligi. 2008 Yillik Ekonomi Raporu. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Finance. (2008). 2008
Annual Economic Report, p.8. Ankara; Ministry of Finance.

In 2002, the "Justice and Development Party" -Adalet ve Kalklnma Partisi, AK
Parti, or simply AKP-came to power, and since then has been pushing for a greater
integration of the Turkish economy to global market place. Interestingly enough,
AKP is a socially conservative, somewhat Islamic-oriented, economically liberal,
and mostly pro-Western political party that is also in pursuit of full European
Union membership for Turke)T. Today, the Turkish experience of the past 86 years
provides an alternative to fundamentalist regimes around the world by proving
that Islam, democracy, and market economics are not mutually exclusive.
With all the turmoil and political bickering, the rapid growth of the Turkish
economy in recent years is mainly due to Turkey's commitment to free trade as
a way to achieve greater prosperity and peace in its region, and its desire to fully
integrate into the global economy. Consequently, Turkish total trade volume has
grown at an annual average rate of 17.46% bet een 1999 and 2008, and 23.64%
between 2002 and 2008 (See Table 4).
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Table 4: Exports, Imports, and Foreign Trade Balance (Thousands USD)

Years

Exports

Imports

Trade
Balance

Trade
Volume

0/0 Change

1998

26,973,952

45,921,392

-$18,947,440

$72,895,344

1999

26,587,225

40,671,272

-$14,084,047

$67,258,497

-7.730/0

2000

27,774,906

54,502,821

-$26,727,914

$82,277,727

22.33%

2001

31,334,216

41,399,083

-$10,064,867

$72,733,299

-11.600/0

2002

36,059,089

51,553,797

-$15,494,708

$87,612,886

20.460/0

2003

47,252,836

69,339,692

-$22,086,856

$116,592,528

33.08%

2004

63,167,153

97,539,766

-$34,372,613

$160,706,919

37.84%

2005

73,476,408

116,774,151

-$43,297,743

$190,250,559

18.38%

2006

85,534,676

139,576,174

-$54,041,498

$225,110,850

18.329·1>

2007

107,271,750

170,062,715

-$62,790,965

$277,334,464

23.200/0

2008

132,271,750

201,963,574

-$69,936,378

$333,990,770

20.43%

Source: Retrieved September 32009 from TUIK - Turkiye Istatistik Kurumu / Turkish Institute of Statistics website. http://www.tuik.
gov.tr/VeriBilgLdo?tb_id==12&ust_id==4

Furthermore, despite the cultural, racial, and religious differences, trade
volume grew dramatically between Turkey and the European Union, Middle
East, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Although Turkey is not a
member of the European Union, its international economics is dominated by
its international trade, direct investments, and tourism flows with the European
Union (See Table 5).
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Table 5: Turkey and European Union (EU) Trade Balance (Thousands USD)
Exports
To EU

0/0

Change

Imports
From EU

0/0

Change

Trade
Deficit/Surplus

2008

63,390,419

4.95%

74,802,380

9.02%

-$11,411,961

2007

60,398,502

26.00%

68,611,562

15.51%

-$8,213,061

2006

47,934,746

15.88%

59,400,922

12.72%

-$11,466,176

2005

41,364,962

13.08%

52,695,793

9.55%

-$11,330,831

2004

36,580,859

33.54%

48,102,744

36.89%

-$11,521,885

2003

27,393,762

34.18%

35,140,139

36.79%

-$7,746,377

Average

21.58%

Average

15.79%

Source: Retrieved September 3,2009 from TUIK-Turkiye Istatistik Kurumu / Turkish Institute of Statistics website. http://www.tuik.
gov.tr/VeriBilgLdo?tb_id=12&ust_id=4

In addition, Turkey's trade, investments, and tourism flows with the Middle
East and CIS grew even faster compare to that with the European Union due to
the oil boom in recent years (See Tables 6 and 7).
Table 6: Turkey and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Trade Balance
(Thousands USD)
Exports

To CIS

0/0

Change

Imports
From CIS

0/0

Change

Trade
Deficit/Surplus

2008

13,938,226

38.160/0

42,613,879

36.30%

-$28,675,653

2007

10,088,336

44.279k>

31,262,659

33.760/0

-$21,174,323

2006

6,992,529

38.28°A>

23,372,924

35.47%

-$16,380,395

2005

5,056,779

27.64°A>

17,252,743

33.46%

-$12,195,965

2004

3,961,619

33.72%

12,926,894

66.220/0

-$8,965,275

2003

2,962,593

30.00%

7,777,111

40.01 %

-$4,814,518

Average

29.87%

Average

30.030/0

Source: Retrieved September 32009 from TUIK - Turkiye Istatistik Kurumu / Turkish Institute of Statistics website. http://www.tuik.
gov.tr/VeriBilgLdo?tb_id= 12&ust_id=4
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Table 7: Turkey and Middle East Trade Balance (Thousands USD)
Exports to
Middle East

% Change

Imports From
Middle East

0/0 Change

Trade
Deficit/Su rpl us

2008

25,430,395

68.62%

17,627,603

39.44%

$7,802,792

2007

15,081,322

33.28%

12,641,279

19.62%

$2,440,043

2006

11,315,751

11.11%

10,568,063

32.65°16

$747,688

2005

10,184,230

28.570/0

7,966,854

42.65%

$2,217,376

2004

7,921,284

44.950/0

5,584,836

25.36%

$2,336,448

2003

5,464,810

58.870/0

4,455,199

39.85%

$1,009,610

Average

29.860/0

Average

22.17%

Source: Retrieved September 32009 from TUIK - Turkiye Istatistik Kurumu / Turkish Institute of Statistics website. http://www.tuik.
gov.tr/VeriBilgLdo?tb_id=12&ust_id=4

Today) Turkey shows the signs of a newly industrialized country. Currently)
Turkey is the largest economy in the Middle East) and if it were a member of
the European Union it would be its sixth largest economy. As a result of rapid
and sustained economic growth and industrialization) today about 95% of
Turkish exports are manufactured products. Motor vehicles and transportation
equipment) iron and steel, knitted apparels) and mineral oils and lubricants are
the leading export products (See Table 8).
Table 8: The Composition of Exports) 2008 (Thousands USD)
Items

Export Products (SUS)

Motor vehicles

$18,326,711

Iron and steel

$14,946,358

Mechanical machinery, equipment, boilers .

$10,258,590

Electrical machines, equipment

$8,003,852

Knitted apparels and accessories

$7,971,713

Mineral fuels, mineral oils and lubricants

$7,531,776

Apparel and accessories

$5,326,729

Plastics
Ships and water vehicles

$3,563,148
~

$2,647,859

Source: Retrieved September 32009 from TUIK-Turkiye Istatistik Kurumu /Turkish Institute of Statistics website. http://www.tuik.
gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4
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In line with the growth and development of the economy, the sectoral
composition of the Turkish economy has changed over time as well. For example,
in 2007 only 8.9 % of the GDP were generated in the agricultural, while 26.8 %
were generated in the industrial sector, and 64.6 % in the services sector (See
Table 9). These percentages suggest and prove that the Turkish economy has
become a newly industrialized economy.
Table 9: The Sectoral Composition of the Economy (% of GDP)

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Agriculture

12.2

11.4

10.7

10.5

10.0

8.9

Industry

25.1

25.7

26.1

26.2

26.5

26.8

Services

62.7

63.0

63.2

63.3

63.5

64.6

Source: Turkiye (umhuriyeti Maliye Bakanligi 2008 Yillik Ekonomi Raporu Republic of Turkey Ministry of Finance. (2008).
2008 Annual Economic Report, p.19. Ankara; Ministry of Finance.

Moreover, during the past two decades Turkey has become a tourism hotspot
for travelers, especially Europeans. According to World Tourism Organization,
in 2007 Turkey was the 9th country in the world in term of t urism revenues, and
10th in tourist arrivals. Turkey's tourism revenues stood at 18.5 billion in 2007
with an annual growth rate of 12.72% since 2000, and ith 22.2 million arrivals
(UNWTO, 2008, June, p. 10). Besides, most touri t com rom culturally more
distant European Union and CIS, and not from the 1 i Ie Ea t.
In addition to developments in industry, touri ill
u i g, and infrastructure,
in recent years Turkey became an important recip· e
r .g direct investment
th
(FDI). In 2007, Turkey was ranked 26 with a FD
145.56 billion, and
the annual FDI inflow was $22 billion, a 10% incr a
red to 2006 (YASED,
2007, July, p. 3). Interestingly, between 2002 a d
% of all FDI in Turkey
e cash rich Middle
originated from the European Union, and 0
East (YASED, 2007, July, p. 5). In 2006, it
of the United Arab
Emirates, most of the FDI in Turkey came
.es such as Austria,
Greece, and the Netherlands that are perce·
rally quite distant to
Turkey (See Table 10). In fact, the first ra
is not very keen to
Turkey's EU membership, the fifth ranked
oses to Turkey's EU
membership, and the third ranked Greec
e 's historic archrival
in the region. Surprisingly, from the cuI
Ie East, United Arab
Emirates was the only foreign direct in
key in 2006.
I
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Table 10: Source Countries of FDI Inflow to Turkey in 2006 (Billions USD)

FDI

Country
Netherlands

5.171

29

Belgium

3.456

19.4

Greece

2.787

15.6

UAE

1.548

8.7

Austria

1.108

6.2

UK

0.883

5

USA

0.693

3.9

France

0.444

2.5

Germany

0.366

2.1

Luxemburg

0.246

1.4

Other

1.115

6.3

Total

17.817

100

Source: YASED-Internationallnvestors Association of Turkey (2007). Foreign Direct Investment Report, p.4

With the rise in living standards in the region, the demand for energy has risen
significantly in recent years. Turkey is poor in terms of oil and gas resources but
very close to rich oil and gas fields of the Middle East, Caspian Sea, and Central
Asia. With its strategic location between the East and the West, Turkey is poised
to become an energy hub and distributor for Europe's energy-hungry economies.
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline is aI, 768 kilometer (1,099 mile) crude oil
pipeline which stretches from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian
Sea to the Mediterranean seaport of Ceyhan. The new pipelines and projects, such
as NABUCCO, South European Gas Ring, Turkey-Greece Interconnector, and the
Blue Stream Pipeline, that are either under construction or at the proposal stage are
likely to improve oil and gas flows from the Middle East, Caspian Sea, and Central
Asian fields to Europe's urban and industrial centers.
All these economic activities, trade, and investment flows make the whole
region with different cultural, religious, and racial backgrounds economically more
integrated than ever in history. The actual data disproves Huntington's hypothesis,
and reinforces the idea that economic cooperation and integration reduces the
likelihood of an upcoming civilizational clash between Islam and the West.
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Conclusion

In the "Clash of Civilizations;' Huntington used the term "torn countries" to
describe countries that he thought were those states whose societies are divided
over the issues of civilizational belonging. He declared Turkey as a prototypical
torn country and tried to make connections between its Muslim identity and its
delayed EU membership.
Huntington (1993) argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim
country and society, and that Turkey's refusal of the Islamic World, and the
European refusal of Turkey as a European country, and the end of the Soviet
Union created an opportunity for Turkey to become the leader of a revived
Asiatic Turkic civilization. Huntington's predictions have been wrong. Today,
Turkey is probably a model fOf a number of countries in the Turkic world and
has strong cultural and economic ties with them, but faces competition from·
Russia, China, and Iran for the regional leadership position. In fact, some of the
Turkic Republics of Central Asia have closer ties with Russia and Iran than they
have with Turkey and are heavily influenced by them.
One thing that really differentiates Turkey from the rest of the Middle
East and Central Asian Turkic Republics is the fact that even though Turkey's
population is 99.9% Muslim, there is no state supported religion written in the
Turkish Constitution. It is a secular and Western-style representative democracy.
Ironically, it is the current administration of the Islamic oriented AKP which has
been pushing for a full ED membership since it came to power in 2002.
Greater economic cooperation, growing international trade, and investments
flows improve the regional living standards and the prospects for greater political
and economic stability. Given that Turkey's 79.77% of exports and 66.16% of
imports are with the ED, Middle East, and CIS makes Turkey a pivotal country
in maintaining peace and bringing greater prosperity in its region. The very
existence of Turkey as a modern secular republic whose population is mostly
Muslim is a proof that civilizations and cultures do not have to go through an
apocalyptic clash. The reality is that the world is more diverse and complex
than what Huntington described. After all, Turkey's foreign policy was defined
eloquently a long time ago in the words of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: "Peace at
Home, Peace in the World;' which has become the motto ofthe Turkish Republic.
Despite the difficulties, Turkey has been able to fuse moderni~ democracy,
and industrialization in a predominantly Muslim country into a viable model.
Growing economic cooperation and integration to the global economy may
be one of the tools we may rely on in avoiding future clashes among countries,
cultures, and even civilizations.
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